Flow-based data sets are necessary for evaluating network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS). In this work, we propose a novel methodology for generating realistic flow-based network traffic. Our approach is based on Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) which achieve good results for image generation.
Introduction
Detecting attacks within network-based traffic has been of great interest in the data mining community over decades. Recently, Buczak and Guven [1] presented an overview of the community effort with regard to this issue. However,
there are still open challenges (e.g. the high cost of false-positives or the lack of labeled data sets which are publicly available) for the successful use of data mining algorithms for anomaly-based intrusion detection [2, 3] . In this work, we focus on a specific challenge within that setting.
Problem Statement. For network-based intrusion detection (NIDS), few labeled data sets are publicly available which contain realistic user behavior and up-to-date attack scenarios. Available data sets are often outdated or suffer from other shortcomings. Using real network traffic is also problematic due to the missing ground truth. Since flow-based data sets contain millions up to billions of flows, manual labeling of real network traffic is difficult even for security experts and extremely time-consuming. As another disadvantage, real network traffic often cannot be shared within the community due to privacy concerns. evaluation of these approaches is given in section 4 and the results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 analyzes related work on network traffic generators for flow-based data. A summary and outlook on future work concludes the paper.
Foundations
This section starts with analyzing the underlying flow-based network traffic.
Then, GANs are explained in more detail. Finally, we explain IP2Vec [11] which is the basis of our third data transformation approach.
Flow-based Network Traffic
We focus on flow-based network traffic in unidirectional NetFlow format [15] .
Flows contain header information about network connections between two endpoint devices like servers, workstation computers or mobile phones. Each flow is an aggregation of transmitted network packets which share some properties [16] . Typically, all transmitted network packets with the same source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port and transport protocol within a time window are aggregated into one flow. NetFlow [15] aggregates all network packets which share these five properties into one flow until an active or inactive timeout is reached. In order to consolidate contiguous streams the aggregation of network packets stops if no further packet is received within a time window of α second (inactive timeout). The active timeout stops the aggregation of network packets after β seconds, even if further network packets are observed to avoid unlikely long entries. Table 1 shows the typical attributes of unidirectional NetFlow [15] data. As shown in Table 1 , NetFlow are heterogeneous data which consists of continuous, numeric, categorical and binary attributes. Most attributes like IP addresses and ports are categorical. Further, there is a timestamp attribute (date first seen), a continuous attribute (duration) and numeric attributes like bytes or packets. We defined the type of TCP flags as binary/categorical. TCP flags can be either interpreted as six binary attributes (e.g. isSYN flag, isACK flag, etc.) or as one categorical value. 
GANs
Discriminative models classify objects into predefined classes [17] and are often used for intrusion detection (e.g. in [18] , [19] or [20] ). In contrast to discriminative models, generative models are used to generate data like flowbased network traffic. Many generative models build on likelihood maximization for a parametric probability distribution. As the likelihood function is often unknown or the likelihood gradient is computationally intractable, some models like Deep Boltzmann Machines [21] use approximations to solve this problem. Other models avoid this problem by not explicitly representing likelihood.
Generative Stochastic Networks for example learn the transition operation of a Markov chain whose stationary distribution estimates the data distribution.
GANs avoid Markov chains estimating the data distribution by a game-theoretic approach: The generator network G tries to mimic samples from the data distribution, while the discriminator network D has to differentiate real and generated samples. Both networks are trained iteratively until the discriminator D can't distinguish real samples from generated samples any more. Beside computa- tional advantages, the generator G is never updated with real samples. Instead, the generator network G is fed with an input vector of noise z. The generator is trained using only the discriminator's gradients through backpropagation.
Therefore, it is less likely to overfit the generator G by memorization and reproduction of real samples. Figure 1 illustrates the generation process.
Goodfellow et al. say that: "another advantage of adversarial networks is that they can represent very sharp, even degenerate distributions" [4] which is the case for some NetFlow attributes. However, (the original) vanilla GANs [4] require the visible units to be differentiable, which is not the case for categorical attributes like IP addresses in NetFlow data. Gulrajani et al. [12] For those reasons, we use Improved Wasserstein Generative Adversarial Networks (WGAN-GP) [12] with the two time-scale update rule (TTUR) from [13] in our work.
IP2Vec
IP2Vec [11] is inspired by Word2Vec [23, 24] and aims at transforming IP addresses into a continuous feature space R m such that standard similarity measures can be applied. For this transformation, IP2Vec extracts available context information from flow-based network traffic. IP addresses which appear frequently in similar contexts will be close to each other in the feature space R m .
More precisely, similar contexts imply to IP2Vec that the devices associated to these IP addresses establish similar network connections. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea. Arrows in Figure 2 
Model
IP2Vec is based upon a fully connected neural network with a single hidden layer (see Figure 3 ). The features extracted from flow-based network traffic constitute the neural network's input. These features (IP addresses, destination ports and transport protocols) define the input vocabulary which contains all IP addresses, destination ports and transport protocols that appear in the flow-based data set. Since neural networks cannot be fed with categorical attributes, each value of our input vocabulary is represented as a one-hot vector the length of which equals the size of the vocabulary. Each neuron in the input and output layer is assigned a specific value of the vocabulary (see Figure 3 ).
Let us assume the training data set contains 100,000 different IP addresses, 20,000 different destination ports and 3 different transport protocols. Then, the size of the one-hot vector is 120,003 and only one component is 1, while all others are 0. Input and output layers comprise exactly the same number of neurons which is equal to the size of the vocabulary. The output layer uses a softmax classifier which indicates the probabilities for each value of the vocabulary that it appears in the same flow (context) as the input value to the neural network.
The softmax classifier [25] normalizes the output of all output neurons such that the sum of the outputs is 1. The number of neurons in the hidden layer is much smaller than the number of neurons in the input layer.
Training
The neural network is trained using captured flow-based network traffic. IP2Vec generates five training samples from each flow. Each training sample consists of an input value and an expected output value. In the first step, IP2Vec selects an input value for the training sample. The selected input value is highlighted in blue in Figure 4 . The expected output values for the corresponding input value are highlighted through black frames with white background. In Figure 4 can be seen that IP2Vec generates three training samples where the source IP address is the input value, one training sample where the destination port is the input value and one training sample where the transport protocol is the input value.
In the training process, the neural network is fed with the input value and tries to predict the probabilities of the other values from the vocabulary. For training samples, the probability of the concrete output value is 1 and 0 for all other values. In general, the output layer indicates the probabilities for each value of the input vocabulary that it appears in the same flow as the given input value.
The network uses back-propagation for learning. This kind of training, however, could take a lot of time. Let us assume that the hidden layer comprises 32 neurons and the training data set encompasses one million different IP addresses and ports. This results in 32 million weights in each layer of the network. Consequently, training such a large neural network is going to be slow. To make things worse, a huge amount of training flows is required for adjusting that many weights and for avoiding over-fitting. Consequently, we have to update millions of weights for millions of training samples. Therefore, IP2Vec attempts to reduce the training time by using Negative Sampling in a similar way as Word2Vec does [23] . In Negative Sampling, each training sample modifies only a small percentage of the weights, rather than all of them. More details on Negative Sampling may be found in [11] and [24] .
Continuous Representation of IP Addresses
After training the neural network, IP2Vec does not use the neural network 
Transformation Approaches
This section describes three different methods to transform the heterogeneous NetFlow data such that they may be processed by Improved Wasserstein
Generative Adversarial Networks (WGAN-GP).
Preliminaries
In general, we use in all three methods the same preprocessing steps for the attributes date first seen, transport protocol, and TCP flags (see Table 1 ).
Usually, the concrete timestamp is marginal for generating realistic flowbased network data. Instead, many intrusion detection systems derive additional information from the timestamp like "is today a working day or weekend day"
or "does the event occur during typical working hours or at night". Therefore, we do not generate timestamps. Instead, we create two attributes weekday and daytime. To be precise, we extract the weekday information of flows and generate seven binary attributes isMonday, isTuesday and so on. Then, we interpret the daytime as seconds [0, 86400) and normalize them to the interval [0, 1]. We transform the transport protocol (see #3 in Table 1 ) to three binary attributes, namely isTCP, isUDP, and isICMP. The same procedure is followed for TCP flags (see #10 in Table 1 ) which are transformed to six binary attributes isURG, isACK, isPUS, isSYN, isRES, and isFIN.
Method 1 -Numeric Transformation
Although IP addresses and ports look like real numbers, they are actually
categorical. Yet, the simplest approach is to interpret them as numbers after all and treat them as continuous attributes. We refer to this method as The attributes duration, bytes and packets (see attributes #2, #8 and #9
in Table 1 ) are normalized to the interval [0, 1]. Table 2 provides examples and compares the three transformation methods.
Method 2 -Binary Transformation
The second method creates several binary attributes for IP addresses, ports, bytes, and packets. We refer to this method as Binary-based Improved Wasser- Table 2 shows an example for this transformation procedure.
Method 3 -Embedding Transformation
The third method transforms IP addresses, ports, duration, bytes, and pack- following the ideas in Section 2.3. We refer to this method as Embedding-based Improved Wasserstein Generative Adversarial Networks (short: E-WGAN-GP).
E-WGAN-GP extends IP2Vec (see Section 2.3) for learning embeddings not only for IP addresses, ports, and transport protocols, but also for the attributes duration, bytes, and packets. To that end, the input vocabulary of IP2Vec is extended by the values of the latter three attributes and additional training pairs are extracted from each flow. Figure 5 presents the extended training sample generation.
Each flow produces 13 training samples each of which consists of an input and an output value. The input values are highlighted in blue in Figure 5 .
The expected output values for the corresponding input value are highlighted through black frames on white background. Our adapted training sample generation extracts further training samples for the attributes bytes, packets and duration. Further, we also create training pairs with the destination IP address as input. Ring et al. [11] argue that it is not necessary to extract training samples with destination IP addresses as input when working on unidirectional
flows. Yet, in this case, IP2Vec does not learn meaningful representation for multi-and broadcast IP addresses, which only appear as destination IP ad-dresses in flow-based network traffic. Table 2 shows the result of an exemplary transformation.
E-WGAN-GP maps flows to embeddings which need to be re-transformed to the original space after generation. To that end, values are replaced by the closest embeddings generated by IP2Vec. For instance, we calculate the cosine similarity between the generated output for the source IP address and all existing IP address embeddings generated by IP2Vec. Then, we replace the output with the IP address with the highest similarity.
Experiments
This section provides an experimental evaluation of our three approaches N-WGAN-GP, B-WGAN-GP and E-WGAN-GP for synthetic flow-based network traffic generation.
Data Set
We use the publicly available CIDDS-001 data set [14] which contains unidirectional flow-based network traffic as well as detailed information about the networks and IP addresses within the data set. Figure 6 shows an overview of the emulated business environment of the CIDDS-001 data set. In essence, the CIDDS-001 data set contains four internal subnets which can be identified by their IP address ranges: a developer subnet (dev ) with exclusively Linux clients, an office subnet (off ) with exclusively Windows clients, a management subnet (mgt) with mixed clients, and a server subnet (srv ). Additional knowledge facilitates the evaluation of the generated data (see Section 4.3).
The CIDDS-001 data set contains four weeks of network traffic. We consider only the network traffic which was captured at the network device within the OpenStack environment (see Figure 6 ) and divide the network traffic in two parts: week1 and week2-4. The first two weeks contain normal user behavior and attacks, whereas week3 and week4 contain only normal user behavior and no attacks. We use this kind of splitting in order to obtain a large training data Figure 6 : Overview of the simulated network environment from the CIDDS-001 data set [14] .
set week2-4 for our generative models and simultaneously provide a reference data set week1 which contains normal and malicious network behavior. Overall, week2-4 contains around 22 million flows and week1 contains around 8.5 million flows. We consider only the TCP, UDP and ICMP flows and remove the 895 IGMP flows from the data set.
Definition of a Baseline
As baseline for our experiments, we build a generative model which creates new flows based on the empirical probability distribution of the input data. The baseline estimates the probability distribution for each attribute by counting from the input data. New flows are generated by drawing from the empirical probability distributions. Each attribute is drawn independently from other attributes.
Evaluation Methodology
Evaluation of generative models is challenging and an open research topic:
Borji [26] analyzed different evaluation measures for GANs. Images generated with GANs are often presented to human judges and evaluated by visual comparison. Another well-known evaluation measure for images is the Inception Score (IS) [27] . IS classifies generated images in 1000 different classes using the Inception Net v3 [28] . IS, however, is not applicable in our scenario since the Inception Net v3 can only classify images, but no flow-based network traffic.
In the IT security domain, there is neither consensus on how to evaluate network traffic generators, nor a standardized methodology [29] . Stiborek et al. [30] use an anomaly score to evaluate their generated data. Siska et al. [31] and Iannucci et al. [32] build graphs and evaluate the diversity of the generated traffic by comparing the number of nodes and edges between generated and real network traffic. Other flow-based network traffic generators often focus on specific aspects in their evaluation, e.g. distributions of bytes or packets are compared with real NetFlow data in [33] and [34] .
Since there is no single widely accepted evaluation methodology, we use several evaluation approaches to assess the quality of the generated data from different views. To evaluate the diversity and distribution of the generated data, 
Generation of Flow-based Network Data
Now, we evaluate the quality of the generated data by the baseline (see 
Parameter Configuration
For all four approaches, we use week2-4 of the CIDDS-001 data set as training input and generate 8.5 million flows for each approach.
We configured N-WGAN-GP, B-WGAN-GP and E-WGAN-GP to use a feed-forward neural network as generator and discriminator. Furthermore, we used the default parameter configuration of [13] and trained the networks for 5 epochs. An epoch is one training iteration over the complete training data set [25] . Consequently, we used each flow of the training data set five times for training the neuronal networks. We observed that a higher number of epochs neither leads to increasing quality nor reduces the loss values of the GANs.
For identifying the number of neurons in each hidden layer, we set up a small parameter study in which we varied to number of neurons from 8 to 192. We found that 80 neurons in each hidden layer were sufficient for B-WGAN-GP and E-WGAN-GP. For N-WGAN-GP, we set the number of neurons in the hidden layer to 24 since the numerical representation of flows is much smaller than for
B-WGAN-GP or E-WGAN-GP.
Additionally, we have to learn embeddings for E-WGAN-GP in a previous step. Therefore, we configured IP2Vec to use 20 neurons in the hidden layer and trained the network like Ring et al. [11] for 10 epochs. Figure 7 shows the temporal distribution of the generated flows and reference week week1. The y-axis shows the flows per hour as a percentage of total traffic and the three lines represent the reference week (week1 ), the generated data of the baseline (baseline), and the generated data of the E-WGAN-GP approach (E-WGAN-GP ). Since all three transformation approaches process the attribute date first seen in the same way, only (E-WGAN-GP ) is included for the sake of brevity. E-WGAN-GP reflects the essential temporal distribution of flows.
Visualization
In the CIDDS-001 data set, the simulated users exhibit common behavior including lunch breaks and offline work which results in temporal limited network activities and a jagged curve (e.g. around 12:00 on working days). However, the curve of E-WGAN-GP is smoother than the curve of the original traffic week1.
In the following, we use different visualization plots in order to get a deeper understanding of the generated data. Figure 8 shows the real distributions (first row) sampled from week1 respectively generated distributions by our maximum likelihood estimator baseline (second row) and generated distributions by our IP addresses from the mgt subnet are typically clients which use services while IP addresses from the srv subnet are servers which offer services. This knowl-edge was not explicitly modeled during data generation.
We will now briefly discuss the conditional distribution of source ports (left column). In the first row, we can clearly distinguish typical client-port (dev, mgt, off ) and server-port (ext, srv ) distributions. As expected, the maximum likelihood baseline is not able to capture the differences of the distributions depending on the subnet of the source IP address and models a distribution which is a combination of all six subnets from the input data. In contrast, the B-WGAN-GP and E-WGAN-GP capture the conditional probability distributions for the source port given the subnet of the source IP address very well.
N-WGAN-GP is incapable of representing the distributions properly: Note
that only flows with external source IP addresses are generated in the selected samples. In-depth analysis of the generated data suggests that numeric representations fail to match the designated subnets exactly. As all generated data is assigned to the ext subnet, it comes as no surprise that the distribution represents a combination of all six subnets from the input data for both source ports (left) and destination IP addresses (right).
For the attribute destination IP address, the distribution is a mixture of external and internal IP addresses for dev, mgt and off subnets (see reference week week1 ). This matches the user roles, surfing on the internet (external) as well as accessing internal services (e.g. printers). For external subnets, the destination IP address has to be within the internal IP address range. Traffic from external sources to external targets does not run through the simulated network environment of the CIDDS-001 data set. Consequently, there is no flow within the CIDDS-001 data set which has a source IP address and a destination IP address from the ext subnet. This fact can be seen for week1 in Figure 8 where flows which have their origin in the ext subnet only address a small range of destination IP addresses which reflect the range of internal IP addresses. E-WGAN-GP and B-WGAN-GP capture this property very well while the baseline and N-WGAN-GP fail to capture this property. 
Euclidean Distances
The second evaluation compares the distribution of the generated and real flow-based network data in each attribute independently. Therefore, we calculate Euclidean distances between the probability distributions of the generated data and the input flow-based network data (week2-4 ) in each attribute. We choose the Euclidean distance over the Kullback-Leibler divergence in order to avoid calculation problems where the probability of generated data is zero. Table 3 highlights the results. We refrain from calculating the Euclidean distance for the attribute date first seen since exact matches of timestamps (considering seconds and milliseconds) do not make sense. At this point, we refer to Figure 7 which analyzes the temporal distribution of the generated timestamps.
Network traffic is subject to concept drift and exact reproduction of probability distributions is not desirable. This fact can be seen in Table 3 where the Euclidean distances between the probability distributions from week1 and week2-4 of the CIDDS-001 data set are between 0.02 and 0.14. Consequently, generated network traffic should have similar Euclidean distances to the training data like the reference week week1. However, it should be mentioned that there is no perfect distance value x which indicates the correct amount of concept drift. The generated data of E-WGAN-GP tends to have similar distances to the training data (week2-4 ) like the reference data set week1. Table 3 
Domain Knowledge Checks
We use domain knowledge checks to evaluate the intrinsic quality of the generated data. To that end, we derive several properties that generated flowbased network data need to fulfill in order to be realistic. We use the following seven heuristics as sanity checks:
• Test 1: If the transport protocol is UDP, then the flow must not have any TCP flags.
• Test 2: The CIDDS-001 data set is captured within an emulated company network. Therefore, at least one IP address (source IP address or destination IP address) of each flow must be internal (starting with 192.168.XXX.XXX).
• Test 3: If the flow describes normal user behavior and the source port or destination port is 80 (HTTP) or 443 (HTTPS), the transport protocol must be TCP.
• Test 4: If the flow describes normal user behavior and the source port or destination port is 53 (DNS), the transport protocol must be UDP.
• Test 5: If a multi-or broadcast IP address appears in the flow, it must be the destination IP address.
• Test 6: If the flow represents a netbios message (destination port is 137 or 138), the source IP addresses must be internal (192.168.XXX.XXX) and the destination IP address must be an internal broadcast (192.168.XXX.255).
• Test 7: TCP, UDP and ICMP packets have a minimum and maximum packet size. Therefore, we check the relationship between bytes and packets in each flow according to the following rule:
42 * packets ≤ bytes ≤ 65.535 * packets Table 4 shows the results of checking the generated data against these rules. B a s e l i n e N -W G A N -G P B -W G A N -G P E -W G A N -G P w e e k 1 The reference data set week1 achieves 100 percent in each test which is not surprising since the data is real flow-based network traffic which is captured in the same environment as the training data set. The baseline approach does not capture dependencies between flow attributes and achieves worse results. This can be especially observed in Tests 1, 4, and 6. Since multi-and broadcast IP addresses appear only in the attribute destination IP address, the baseline cannot fail Test 5 and achieves 100 percent.
For our generative models, E-WGAN-GP achieves the best results on average. The usage of embeddings leads to more meaningful similarities within categorical attributes and facilitates the learning of interrelationships. Embeddings, however, also reduce the possible resulting space since no new values can be generated. B-WGAN-GP generates flows which achieve high accuracy in In contrast to that, the binary representation of B-WGAN-GP leads to better results in that test. This effect can be observed in Test 2 (see Table 4 ) where N-WGAN-GP has problems with the generation of private IP addresses. Instead, this approach often generates non-private IP addresses such as 191.168.X.X or 192.167.X.X.
Discussion
In image generation, the original application domain of GANs, small errors do not have serious consequences. A brightness 191 instead of 192 in a generated pixel has nearly no effect on the image and the error is (normally) not visible for human eyes. Further, N-WGAN-GP normalizes the numeric attributes bytes and packets to the interval [0, 1]. The generated data are then de-normalized using the original training data. Here, we can observe that real flows often have typical byte sizes like 66 bytes which are also not exactly matched. This results in higher Euclidean distances in these attributes (see Table 3 ). Overall, the first method N-GAN-WP does not seem to be suitable for generating realistic flow-based network traffic. Table 4 ). Further, Figure 8 indicates that B-WGAN-GP captures the internal structure of the traffic very well even though it is less restricted than E-WGAN-GP with respect to the treatment of previously unseen values. it does not make much sense to generate unseen service ports. However, the situation is different for typical client ports.
B-WGAN-GP

E-WGAN-GP
Generally, GANs capture the implicit conditional probability distributions very well, given that a proper data representation is chosen which is the case for E-WGAN-GP and B-WGAN-GP (see Figure 8 ). While the visual differences between binary and embedded data representations are subtle, the domain knowledge checks show larger quality differences. Overall, this analysis
suggests that E-WGAN-GP and B-WGAN-GP are able to generate good flowbased network traffic. While E-WGAN-GP achieves better evaluation results, B-WGAN-GP is not limited in the value range and is able to generate previously unseen values for example for IP addresses or ports.
Related Work
Molnár et al. [29] give a comprehensive overview of network traffic gen- Category (I). As the name suggests, Replay Engines use previously captured network traffic and replay the packets from it. Often, the aim of Replay Engines is to consider the original inter packet time (IPT) behavior between the network packets. TCPReplay [36] and TCPivo [37] are well-known representatives of this category. Since network traffic is subject to concept drift, replaying already known network traffic only makes limited sense for generating IDS evaluation data sets. Instead, a good network traffic generator should be able to generate new synthetic flow-based network traffic.
Category (II). Maximum Throughput Generators usually aim to test end-toend network performance [29] . Iperf [38] is such a generator and can be used for testing bandwidth, delay jitter, and loss ratio characteristics. Consequently, methods from this category primarily aim at evaluating network (bandwidth)
performance. 
Category (III). Attack Generators
Summary
Labeled flow-based data sets are necessary for evaluating and comparing anomaly-based intrusion detection methods. Evaluation data sets like DARPA 98
and KDD Cup 99 cover several attack scenarios as well as normal user behavior.
These data sets, however, were captured at some point in time such that concept drift of network traffic causes static data sets to become obsolete sooner or later.
In this paper, we proposed three synthetic flow-based network traffic generators which are based on Improved Wasserstein GANs (WGAN-GP) [12] using the two time scale update rule from [13] . B-WGAN-GP is able to maintain more information (e.g. subnet information of IP addresses) from the categorical input data. The third approach E-WGAN-GP learns meaningful continuous representations of categorical attributes like IP addresses using IP2Vec [11] . The preprocessing of E-WGAN-GP is inspired from the text mining domain which also has to deal with non-continuous input values. Then, we generated new flow-based network traffic based on the CIDDS-001 data set [14] in an experimental evaluation. Our experiments indicate that especially E-WGAN-GP is able to generate realistic data which achieves good evaluation results. B-WGAN-GP achieves similarly good results and is able to create new (unseen) values in contrast to E-WGAN-GP. The quality of network data generated by N-WGAN-GP is less convincing, which indicates that straight forward numeric transformation is not appropriate.
Our research indicates that GANs are well suited for generating flow-based network traffic. We plan to extend our approach in order to generate sequences of flows instead of single flows. In addition, we want to work on the development of further evaluation methods.
